What can your DNS provider see about you?

Encrypted DNS protects your queries in transit, but your DNS provider can still learn more than you might expect.

The domain names your devices look up are sent to your Domain Name System (DNS) provider and, if connected directly, so are their source IP addresses. If the queries are not encrypted, they’re also readable along their network path. Your DNS privacy depends on who can observe the requests and what gets stored, if anything. The privacy controls available to you vary greatly depending on the DNS provider you choose.

What a visit reveals

Suppose you open https://shop.example/item/42. If your device doesn’t already have an up-to-date address for shop.example, it asks your DNS provider for one, so it can connect to it.

The cookies, passwords, page contents, or even the path (/item/42) aren’t part of the DNS query, but part of a separate HTTPS exchange with the website. However, names such as customer-1138.shop.example are sent in full, so even a domain name can contain identifying information.

The resolver can see the timing of the request, the protocol used for that request, and the response it received back. The source IP address may belong to a shared home/office connection or a VPN exit node. A DNS filtering service will be able to see the result of the filtering decision made by the service, as well as a profile identifier and if clients have provided such information, device or application labels; so they are able to correlate multiple requests even when the IP has changed.

The collective record of all of these queries is noisy, as many applications make requests in the background, and people share connections. It is also an incomplete picture, since repeat visits are often handled by answers saved locally by your browser for speed. Despite all of that, over time patterns emerge that can reveal which services you used and when you’re usually online.

Who else can read the queries?

A common home setup forwards queries through the router to the DNS resolver assigned by the ISP, unencrypted. Anyone able to capture the network activity can read the names, answers, addresses, and times. That includes the network operator. The website’s HTTPS connection does not encrypt this separate DNS lookup.

DNS over HTTPS (DoH), DNS over TLS (DoT), and DNS over QUIC (DoQ) protect the DNS exchange in transit. With a correctly authenticated encrypted connection, network traffic observers cannot directly read it. The resolver still decrypts the question to answer it.

Here’s a comparison of who can read the DNS contents, assuming a direct connection between the device and the resolver, without a relay or a VPN. Here, “Local observer” means someone able to capture local network packets.

ConnectionLocal observerISPDNS resolver
Plain DNS to ISPYesYes, in transit and as resolverYes
Plain DNS to outside providerYesYes, in transitYes
Encrypted DNS to ISPNoYes, as resolverYes
Encrypted DNS to outside providerNoNoYes

It also matters where the encryption starts. If only the router’s connection to the DNS resolver is encrypted, device to router queries remain readable locally. Configuring encrypted DNS on the device protects that part as well. Our protocol guide explains the connection options.

Although the use of encrypted transports mitigates passive surveillance of the DNS payload, observers still see connection addresses, timing, and traffic sizes; your ISP may infer destinations from your subsequent website connections.

Who controls what gets kept?

While encrypted DNS protects the queries in transit, it is the DNS resolver’s logging policies that determine what information is stored once the resolver receives a query and returns a response.

A DNS resolver operated by your ISP is likely to follow their system-wide policy. Check to see if your ISP has options for you to control this. Turning off your router’s logging, or using encrypted DNS with your ISP’s own resolver, will not stop your ISP from logging queries.

Cloudflare’s publicly available DNS resolver at 1.1.1.1 offers encrypted DNS, but does not have individual settings for logging and retention. It has published commitments to limit the storage of source IPs, and to delete any limited resolver logs within 25 hours, apart from limited sampled data used for aggregation. Aggregated data may be retained indefinitely. Again, these are policy decisions made by the DNS operator.

Similarly, Google’s public DNS service at 8.8.8.8 is subject to its own fixed policy. It temporarily logs source IPs alongside DNS queries, typically with a 24 to 48-hour deletion period, unless a security or abuse issue is detected, in which case retention can be longer. It also keeps sampled records, with IP addresses replaced with approximate locations, as permanent logs. Enabling encrypted DNS doesn’t give you any control over logging retention.

When selecting a DNS resolver, it’s important to consider both the policy and what settings you have control over. In some cases, a provider’s fixed policy (such as Quad9’s 9.9.9.9) will already be set to minimise the data collected by the resolver, while other resolvers may provide more settings, but this does not necessarily mean they keep less data. In either case, this relies on the DNS resolver honouring its policy.